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ABSTRAC'r 
Receivers have become corporate undertakers. Their primary 
function is to carry out the secured creditors rights of 
recourse to property by reason of the debtor's default. 
Abuses of receiver's powers have been regulated reactively 
in case-law by development of duties of care. An 
appropriate balance is needed between the rights of 
creditors and debtors. After reviewing policy issues and 
introducing hiving-down, the paper looks generally at 
duties of care. 
Hiving-down is presented as meeting the legitimate 
interests of security and property law as an efficient 
"self help" device facilitating realisation of property. 
Other parties affected may be incidentally benefitted by 
the use of this device: such external benefits are a 
consequence not a purpose of the technique. 
The advantages of hive-down are reviewed. In the course of 
more detailed review of common methods of hive-down, 
selected issues are discussed including tax aspects. The 
regulating duties and standards of care are briefly applied 
to the process. The impact on and rights of other persons 
affected by hive-down are reviewed with main emphasis on 
remedies of unsecured creditors and arrangements with 
employees. A recent example of efficient use of the process 
is used as a case study. Incidental references to changes 
enacted in the Receiverships Bill are raised throughout the 
paper. 
The conclusion is that the device may be useful as an 
alternative to breakup sale where a short-term sale is 
unlikely and the core business, if separated from its debt-
burden or mismanagement, is likely to trade profitably 
until sale can be carried out at a more propitious time. 
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specific statutory authority to transfer undertakings would 
legitimise the process. Otherwise given its necessarily 
flexible application, the present duties of care and clear 
development of flexible objective standards of care, based 
on good faith and reasonableness, provide adequate 
regulation to achieve balances. 
The text of the paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 16,100 
words. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
It has been said that the prime purpose of the company 
structure is to reward the capital invested in it by the 
shareholder. However, "where the company is insolvent or 
even doubtfully solvent, the interests of the company are 
in reality the interests of the existing creditors alone11 l. 
The receiver is a creature of English equity law whose 
appointment out of court by contract was first recognised 
in 18972 , with subsequent reactive development by case law 
in parallel with development of the floating charge3 • 
Receivership law is piece-meal and substantially 
unregulated in parts; even where principles can be located, 
useful objective criteria are often unavailable. New 
Zealand is said to be in "dire need of good law114 in this 
area. Part VII of the Companies Act 1955 enacted limited 
statutory duties on receivers with further provisions added 
in 1980. Legislative intervention is increasing in 
recognition of strains and inequities in the system with 
impetus from the perceived benefit of trans-Tasman 
harmonisation in which insolvency law is seen as a testing 
grounds. In England the Cork Report6 lead ultimately to 
enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986 creating and 
regulating a new office of "administrative receiver". In 
Australia the Harmer Report7 also isolated objectives of 
insolvency law and proposed corporate rehabilitation 
measures. In 1989 the New Zealand Law Commission8 
recommended repeal of Part VII and its replacement by 
amendment to the Property Law Act 1952. Expanded 
receivership provisions are now to be enacted as a separate 
Receiverships Bill with some amendment to the Property Law 
Act in respect of mortgagees remedies. The Bill's 
provisions will apply to companies registered under the 
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companies Act 1955 and under provisions to be enacted from 
the Companies Bill and will apply to existing receiverships 
except in certain specified respects9 • 
The vast majoritylO of receivers in New Zealand are 
believed to be appointed out of Court pursuant to standard 
trading bank debentures granted by private limited 
liability companies, principally to provide floating charge 
security over undertaking as a requirement of the bank 
providing working capital. This paper does not accordingly 
address receiverships of assets of individuals, or 
appointments by courts or under enactments other than the 
Companies Act 1955: statutory references are to that Act 
unless otherwise stated. 
1.2 Enter The Receiver 
The receiver has been likened to a corporate doctor11 • A 
tendency is emerging to promote receivership as having 
capacity to effect corporate rescue and suggesting 
legislative promotion of that function. In reality the 
receiver is invariably a corporate undertaker12 involved 
essentially in orderly liquidation of assets. Few 
receiverships trade out: many undertakings are buried as 
paupers13. Trading on involves significant risks but 
carries little incentive: claims of preferential creditors 
and costs will dominate recovery. "The practical result is 
that a receiver sometimes decides to close a business, 
abandoning the possibility of selling it as a going 
concern, merely to protect himself against claims by 
preferential creditors1114 • Proof of loss caused by ongoing 
trade can be readily found; the receiver may be criticised 
but rarely sued for a decision to realise assets 
immediately15. Sale as a going concern is likely to be 
impractical unless the core business is viable and debt can 
be retired. Break-up sale will invariably be at less than 
5 
market value, in effect transferring wealth from unpaid 
general creditors to the purchaser/investor. Receivers 
complain of being appointed too late to rescue the 
undertaking. Receivership has become a last resort for 
financiers after informal arrangements have failed; 
write-off of debt is seen as inevitable. Management, 
particularly of smaller undertakings, will delay flagging 
difficulties, viewing receivership as unnecessary corporate 
liquidation usually impacting on their own personal 
solvency. 
1.3 Hiving-Down Introduced 
Into this gloomy picture comes hiving-down, not as a kindly 
doctor but as an arbitrary debt-remission device focussed 
on improving realisation of assets for the secured 
creditor. Essentially, the viable core of the undertaking 
is identified and transferred to a wholly-owned subsidiary 
company, with a view to later sale to a third party as a 
solvent going concern with recovery of goodwill potentially 
maximised. This technique is essentially a company 
reconstruction in its simplest form whereby the trade 
survives the death of the company. 
The practice, familiar to receivers in New Zealand, appears 
to be in extensive use elsewhere to the extent of express 
statutory recognition in England/Wales and in Scotland16 • 
Initially borrowed from techniques used in bankruptcy, 
hiving-down became popular in England by 1954 when trading 
in loss companies became possible. Hiving-down remains "the 
sharpest sword in the receiver's armoury'' and is recognised 
as fulfilling, in appropriate cases, the objectives of 
insolvency law. The Cork Report (para 495), for example, 
stated: 
"Hiving-down enables companies which would be profitable if 
only they could shed their accumulated debt burden to start 
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a new life. Businesses are thus saved from closing down, 
jobs are preserved, and the economy as a whole benefits11 17. 
similarly: 
"[Hiving-down is] one economic benefit which most critics 
[of the floating charge] would be happy to concede11 l8. 
The device is largely unregulated except through imposition 
of duties on the receiver. This paper reviews duties of 
care relating to hive-down from the premise that the proper 
entitlement of the secured creditor is orderly realisation 
of a debtor's assets in the event of significant default 
for the primary purpose of repayment of its debt; the 
receiver historically and today is appointed for the prime 
purpose of converting property into cash. It is an equally 
proper function of insolvency law to prevent abuse of that 
process by imposition of duties. In that the duties 
themselves may discourage rescue, they may in fact have 
some deadening effect acting to the disadvantage of those 
parties intended to be protected. Hiving-down may, in 
appropriate cases, have incidental benefit to some of those 
persons. 
The sources of law on hive-down are fragmented: the process 
has appeared in case-law infrequently only and tends to be 
put aside without detailed comment. Incidental and often 
brief references are found in texts but no extensive review 
appears to have been undertaken. 
1.4 The Nature of Corporate Receivership 
1.4.1 Sources Of Authority 
The original source of the receiver's authority is the 
company's power in its constitution to create mortgages and 
charges19 and to confer on the debentureholder by contract 
the right to appoint a receiver contingent on the 
occurrence of a specified event. From the date on which the 
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receiver has been appointed and has taken possession of the 
charged assets, the powers of the company (excluding 
director's "residual" powers) are vested in the receiver, 
invariably as agent and attorney of the company with power 
to control, manage and sell the undertaking. The receiver 
separately contracts with the debentureholder. corporate 
receivership is accordingly a hybrid emerging from the 
relationship of the law of contract and the law of property 
with aspects of company law and insolvency law grafted on. 
1.4.2 ownership And Realisation Of Property 
once the receiver is appointed, the law of property becomes 
first among equals. The corporate structure, the receiver's 
pre-liquidation agency, and the principles of insolvency 
law are essentially mere parameters within which the 
receiver's primary function of property realisation is 
carried out. Fundamental within that proposition are the 
proprietary rights available to the debentureholder as 
assignee of beneficial interest in that property. The 
charge embodies the concept of hypothecation20 being 
security rights available on default. Those rights arise 
from powers granted irrevocably in the contract and from 
operation of the debenture charge as a conditional 
equitable assignment by way of security in favour of the 
debentureholder, conditional on the company's equity of 
redemption. such assignment under the fixed charge is 
immediate on creation or on acquisition of future property. 
The assignment under the floating charge is suspended until 
crystallisation. once it beneficially holds the undertaking 
the debentureholder is entitled as a prima facie 
proposition of property law to sell it and apply the 
proceeds to its debt and the costs of realisation. This 
right is subject to any restrictions in the contract and is 
further subject to any reservations, defects, liens or 
equitable rights or title having priority to the charge: 
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until any realisation the equity of redemption remains the 
property of the assignor or, if insolvent, the assignor's 
general creditors. The real significance of security is 
this right to contract out of insolvency by direct recourse 
to property. Essentially then, receivership is not an 
insolvency process but a device to facilitate exercise of 
proprietary rights. The ongoing policy issue is to what 
extent the law should interfere with the rights of sale of 
an owner (in the sense of equitable mortgagee) of its own 
property. 
1.s Policy Issues 
(1) The Immovable Object 
Two competing policies are apparent. The narrow 
contractarian policy involves protection of individual 
rights: Courts have been reluctant to intervene in 
contracts or conduct incidental to the powers of sale 
unless dishonesty or bad faith are evidenced; in granting 
the charge the company loses the right to dictate what can 
be sold2~. The policy is founded on the pre-eminence of 
secured credit; ''Every creditor is entitled to get and hold 
the best security the law allows him to take1122 • There 
will always be corporate failure; creditors are entitled to 
assess risk and advance to an appropriate level based on 
any security they may, by "prudence and foresight1123 
require; lenders require certainty of priority when 
assessing risk finance; curtailment of remedies erodes 
freedom of contract. Uncertainty will dry up credit sources 
and increase finance costs with subsequent effect on 
supply24 • 
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(2) The Constant Force 
The broader utilitarian view is based on the pari passu 
rule in equity that creditors should share "equality of 
suffering1125 • Essentially insolvency law is an exercise in 
determining apportionment of damage and minimising the 
inevitable danger of chain failure. The floating charge 
maximises such danger by transferring loss to non-
preferential creditors while allowing the receivership 
first, benefit of pre-receivership supplies without 
obligation to pay and secondly, to "sweep off everything: 
and a great scandal it is1126 : the company is financed as 
much by suppliers induced to wait for payment as by the 
bank which can monitor cashflow27 • The floating charge 
dries up other credit sources by absorbing the company's 
equity but does not necessarily increase bank lending. The 
equality principle is enhanced by any measure promoting 
corporate rehabilitation; this is seen as "not sufficiently 
encouraged by present law11 28 . 
1.6 creating A Balance 
Security law requires balance first, between ability to 
borrow and expectation of repayment plus right of recourse, 
and secondly, between enabling the lender to carry out such 
recourse while ensuring protection of those perceived, in 
economic terms, to be weak. The contractarian view has 
traditionally dominated insolvency law with the pari passu 
policy operating principally within classes. While the pre-
eminence of secured credit is currently assured29 , some 
signs of policy movement towards a broader view are evident 
particular1 at advisory levels. cork (para 1485)for example, 
was "convinced that a proper balance has not yet been 
achieved". Such policy assessment has given rise to 
comparatively recent creation and rapid expansion of duties 
of care on receivers; each step necessarily places further 
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restrictions on rights of realisation of property by 
secured creditors and, the contractarian would contend, 
further erodes freedom of contract, Interference with 
fundamental property rights is the more extra-ordinary; 
effectively the equitable mortgagee as "owner" of a 
beneficial interest in property intending sale of that 
interest must have regard (without obligation to account) 
to third parties whose interest is in the estate of the 
property's former owner rather than directly in the 
property itself. Nonetheless such development of duties, 
now far beyond protection of the equity of redemption, is 
firmly established and is further expanded in the 
Receiverships Bill to a duty to unsecured creditors, albeit 
at a low level. In policy terms however, increasing risk to 
the receiver of personal liability may promote conservative 
realisation policies which will not necessarily create the 
balance being sought. 
2.0 RECEIVERS DUTIES 
2.1 overview 
The receiver's overlapping duties are founded: 
(a) In contract and agency 
(b) In equity, in particular fiduciary and good faith 
duties 
(c) In tort, in particular in negligence 
(d) In statute, in the Companies Act 1955 
2.2 Range Of Persons owed Duties 
The range of persons owed duties has been developed in New 
Zealand, on the more expansionist Anns 30 "proximity and 
policy" approach as "a straight forward application of the 
neighbour principle11 31. Retreat from that approach by the 
House of Lords in favour of development "incrementally and 
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by analogy with existing categories" has now been 
reconciled in New Zealand. In contending for "a 
comprehensive review of relevant factors, and the exercise 
of a judicial judgment to achieve a reasonable and just 
result1132 • New Zealand courts are unlikely to change their 
present approach. 
The range of persons to whom a duty is owed was recently 
stated by Gault Jin First City corporation Limited v 
Downsview Nominees Limited (No 2)33: 
"A receiver owes a duty of care to his appointing 
debentureholder, the company of which he is an agent, a 
guarantor of the debt, and to subsequent debenture holders. 
In each case the reasoning is identical. All have an 
interest in the assets of the company, all are directly 
affected by the receiver's action, all will suffer 
foreseeable loss if the receiver fails to exercise 
reasonable care" 
The duties have since been extended to guarantors34 and 
assignees35 of the subsequent debentures. Somers Jin 
Henderson v Price36 stated that a receiver ''is required to 
carry out his duties with the interests of the company, its 
creditors, and shareholders in mind". Extension to 
unsecured creditors and shareholders may not have been 
intended on the facts and, in the case of shareholders, 
appears inconsistent with prior case-law. Holland Jin 
Rogers v Bullen37 has since found (obiter) that there is 
no duty to shareholders: while the company is interested in 
surplus assets after payment of debts, the interest of 
shareholders lies behind the corporate veil. This view 
appears correct on Foss v Harbottle38 principles: the 
company through director's residual powers is the proper 
plaintiff where its agent is in default. While no duty of 
care to general unsecured creditors has yet been found, 
this now appears an inevitable development despite 
conceptual anomalies39. 
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2.3 Duties on Trading on 
on appointment the receiver may elect to trade on briefly 
before determining whether the likely sale price as a going 
concern justifies risks of further trading. In any 
particular business the decision may be self-evident, say, 
against trading a construction company with overruns on 
quoted current work.Although case-law is unclear40, there 
may be a positive duty to trade on in some rare 
circumstances. In electing to trade on the receiver is not 
a "White Knight or a mere substitute for the previous 
management4111 and should not overlook that the purpose of 
appointment was to protect and recover the sum owed to the 
debentureholder. In Price v Henderson42 a receiver who 
elected to trade on "hypnotised" by a perceived need to 
preserve the company's goodwill was liable for trading 
losses where the debt could have been readily recovered. 
The Harmer Report's logical recommendation to extend duties 
of care to management (as well as sale) of assets is 
adopted in the Receiverships Bi11 43 • 
2.4. Duties on Sale 
The receiver's paramount duty under section 345B on 
realisation of charged assets is to "exercise all 
reasonable care to obtain the best price reasonably 
obtainable at the time of sale". The duty applies to the 
means not the end; provided proper processes are 
undertaken, the receiver need not necessarily obtain such 
price, The formula recognises that, notwithstanding best 
endeavours, the receiver will seldom achieve a market value 
for assets: Harmer's initial suggestion that the duty be 
linked to market value has, rightly, not been adopted in 
the Receiverships Bill. The duty has been extensively 
discussed elsewhere: in brief, the receiver may choose the 
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timing of sale irrespective of market conditions but should 
test the market by proper advertising and contact with 
prospective purchasers having regard to the local, national 
or international scope of the market for that business, by 
use of specialist agents/brokers and by choice of the 
proper method of sale44 , What is 'proper' will vary from 
case to case but the "onus on receivers is not a heavy 
one11 45. This duty is presently owed to the company alone46. 
2.5 standard Of care 
The commercial realities overlie. In Downsview Gault J 
said: 
"It is well recognised that a receiver occupies a 
difficult position being required to make commercial 
decisions on behalf of a company which is already in 
extreme financial difficulty ••• the receiver's duty 
must be set at a realistic level bearing in mind the 
commercial exigencies of the situation. If there is 
clear conflict the receiver is entitled to favour the 
interests of the debentureholder who appointed him" 
and further: 
"the complex situation usually existing at time of 
appointment of a receiver means that he must have the 
widest discretion as to the manner in which he chooses 
to act in achieving the objective11 47. 
Subject to the fundamental duty of good faith, the standard 
of care expected of the receiver is: 
"that of a person skilled and experienced in 
receivership work, but examined carefully in light of 
the primary duty he has to the debentureholder, his 
duties to the company, and the state of affairs with 
which he is presented11 48. 
Courts have been reluctant to impose liability for 
professional or commercial decisions made in good faith. In 
14 
the medical negligence case of Maynard49 Lord scarman 
considered there was no negligence "if at the time the 
decision was taken it was reasonable in the sense that a 
responsible body of medical opinion would have accepted it 
as proper", notwithstanding that an equally competent body 
of opinion might consider the decision to be wrong. 
Similarly in Downsview, Gault J said:50 
"I accept that another accountant at that time might 
have formed a different view in good faith. If, in his 
judgment, it was appropriate to trade on, it could not 
be said that it would have been negligent to do so". 
A multi-layer "reasonable receiver" test may be emerging. 
2.6 The Receiverships Bill 
The Bill51 : 
1. Preserves the best price duty owed to the company as 
the receiver's paramount obligation. The 
receiver's failure to comply with the directions 
of the debentureholder is not a breach of duty to 
the debentureholder. 
2. confirms the receiver's secondary duty to the 
debentureholder to exercise powers "in a manner he or 
~ ,C&"/,'l~,rct,C,-:::5 ·.,-6 /.;:,,e ,,-. ·~ be~.,,. 
interests" of the debentureholder. The expected 
standard should not trouble any prudent receiver. 
3. To the extent consistent with the above, the receiver 
must have "reasonable regard" to the interests of 
(i) The company 
(ii) Persons claiming an interest in the property 
through the company 
(iii) Unsecured creditors 
(iv) sureties 
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use of •regard' (equivalent to 'not recklessly disregard') 
in place of •care' and 'interests' instead of 'best 
interests' point to a low standard of care to this group. 
3.0 THE HIVE-DOWN 
3.1 Overview 
There are various methods of hiving-down. Most commonly: 
(a) A 'clean' company is formed, purchased, or co-opted 
by the receiver as an independent subsidiary 
usually wholly owned by the company in 
receivership of which the receiver is a director 
not a receiver. 
(b) A 'hiving-down' agreement transferring assets is 
signed between the parent (through the agency of 
the receiver with power to affix the common seal) 
and the subsidiary (through the receiver's control 
of the board of directors). 
(c) The sale and purchase price is entered in a loan 
account as inter-group liability owed by the 
subsidiary to the parent. Repayment of principal 
may be •on demand' but deferred until sale of the 
subsidiary and/or the transferred assets. Interest 
may be set at a market rate with payment either 
from any trading profits or again (if group losses 
cannot be used) deferred until ultimate sale. 
Security by way of debenture granted by the 
subsidiary can be completed if the circumstances 
require. 
The purpose of the hive-down, as Phillips J. has put it, 
will be: 
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"to segregate the saleable assets of the company into 
a clean package, free of obligation whether to staff or 
creditors, which will be more saleable and which, if 
the transaction is correctly effected, may bring to the 
purchaser certain fiscal advantage11 52. 
The subsidiary will independently trade, preferably without 
resort to further third party security. At an appropriate 
time the subsidiary will advertise its business53 for sale, 
completed either through sale of shares or by sale of the 
assets and winding up the subsidiary. on settlement, the 
purchaser will usually advance capital to the subsidiary 
sufficient to discharge the hive-down loan account. After 
settlement, the receiver will be able to apply the net 
proceeds in the prescribed priority and might then 
terminate the receivership. 
Hiving-down will often be completed within a short period 
from appointment of the receiver and may be pre-planned as 
part of the debentureholders's realisation strategy. Before 
examining the procedure in greater detail it is appropriate 
to review the receiver's powers and factors likely to be 
facing the receiver on appointment. 
3.2 Advantages Of Hive-down For The Receivership. 
1. Any pressure of potential liquidation proceedings by 
a dissatisfied unsecured creditor is largely 
removed. Various considerations are examined 
later. 
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2. The work in progress can be completed and/or the viable 
assets can be traded to potentially reduce the debt 
owed to the appointing debenture holder. 
3. Trade is further facilitated in that: 
(a) The undertaking is freed of all onerous contractual 
obligations of the parent to third parties and of 
much of its bad debt. 
(b) ongoing suppliers to the subsidiary have a clearer 
picture independent of the tangle of pre-
receivership creditors of their ability to recover 
any credits or goods supplied. 
(c) The demands of pre-existing creditors can more 
readily be postponed to immediate needs; the 
receiver may devote more input into profitable 
operation of the subsidiary. 
(d) The subsidiary is solvent and can operate in 
accordance with its Articles 
(e) The subsidiary can transact its business without 
the requirement in s346(2) to state in all 
documents that a receiver has been appointed54 • 
(f) The subsidiary will be a new occupier/consumer 
which may be entitled to require essential 
supplies55 without the receiver's guarantee or 
responsibility for payment of arrears. 
4. Reconstruction by way of hive-down might be required by 
a franchisor/licensor as a condition of allowing 
continued operation of the franchise/licence after the 
insolvency has surfaced. 
s. The trade can be eventually sold at a time likely to 
provide maximum return. This may be useful where 
cashflow for the business is seasonal or where tax 
advantage can be taken. 
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6. A •neat commercial package' where a purchaser can gauge 
value more accurately is created. The value of goodwill 
might be protected from the stigma of receivership, 
perhaps assisted by the subsidiary using a similar 
trading name to that of the parent. Balance sheets for 
the independent unit will more readily demonstrate to 
the market that the business can and is trading 
profitably. The perception that 'fire sale' bargains 
are available will be reduced. 
7. The benefit of the parent's tax losses might be 
retained. Some considerations are reviewed later. 
8. The subsidiary is liable for debts incurred in the 
course of ongoing trade. The receiver will not be 
personally liable under s345(2) 56 for that trade unless 
s/he elects to take on personal liability or remotely 
in respect of obligations as director. Unless it 
intervenes extensively in the operation of the 
subsidiary the appointing debenture holder will not be 
liable for any trading loss by the subsidiary but will 
take the benefit. 
9. The statutory duties, particularly section 348 
reporting57, and their costs are substantially avoided. 
The subsidiary's financial position can be more 
confidential from competitors and prospective 
purchasers although "receipts and payments" to and from 
the subsidiary must be disclosed. 
10. While rationalisation of staff is possible and may 
indeed be essential, hiving-down will generally offer 
prospects of continued employment in a viable concern 
for as many employees as practical or at least allow 
the employees time to consider alternatives without 
being dependant on the state. 
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11. Apart from the technical advantages a hive-down "can in 
appropriate cases be of immense psychological 
importance in that it can offer the prospect of a fresh 
start for employees and those who deal with the 
business1158 • If the core reasons for business failure 
are accepted as mismanagement and under-capitalisation 
and such problems are seen to be addressed by 
appointment of a professional receiver/manager and by 
capital input or indulgence from the debentureholder, 
in either case with a view to rescue of the business, 
then renewed enthusiasm and improved productivity may 
well be anticipated. 
3.3 Inappropriateness/Difficulties 
Even if the core business appears viable, hiving-down will 
not always be appropriate (inter alia): 
1. If cost and risk are not justifiable where the business 
is small-scale and/or trading on is likely to be brief: 
liquidation at the state's expense may be preferred59 • 
2. There may not be premises nor suppliers nor personnel 
available to trade further. 
3. Where immediate trading loss is reasonably anticipated 
even if the longterm prospects are favourable. 
4. If finance/cashflow is not available. 
s. Where ownership of any significant proportion of the 
assets is in dispute. 
6. Where there is no realistic prospect of ultimate sale or 
the margin between likely sale values on a break-up or 
going concern basis (allowing for obligations to 
employees and preferential creditors) do not justify 
the risks, delay and cost of further trading. 
7. If group tax losses may not be fully useable by the 
subsidiary. The receiver may be under a duty to take 
maximum advantage of those losses60 (unless other 
considerations are more beneficial). 
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8. Where use of the assets to continue the business depends 
on consents of other creditors or chargeholders 
including, (for example) lessors, franchisors, or 
persons having copyright and trademark entitlements. 
9. If the interests of any third party contractor or 
subsequent chargeholder would support an injunction or 
a remedy in damages against the receiver personally 
and/or the debentureholder and such action is likely. 
Costs of defending litigation may be an influence. 
10. Where a prior chargeholder is likely to appoint its own 
receiver, or reap most of the benefit, particularly 
where interest is accruing at penalty rates. 
3.4 Powers Of Receivers To Hive-Down 
To conduct a hive-down the receiver must as a minimum have 
first, power of sale of the viable assets and secondly, 
power to establish, manage and sell a subsidiary or assets 
held by a subsidiary. Such powers are subject to any limits 
in the company's constitution: the receiver as agent can do 
no more than the company itself. The consent of any other 
secured creditor may be necessary. The Receiverships Bill 
will confer on the receiver (subject to the terms of the 
debenture) powers to manage the property in receivership 
and to carry on an associated business 61. There is no 
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statutory power of sale in either the companies Act 1955 
nor the Receiverships Bill. Ordinarily broad powers of sale 
and management of the company's assets as agent are 
conferred by the debenture along with a host of incidental 
powers. Most receivers will have full power to carry out 
the hive-down. 
3.5 The Hive-down Process 
For present purposes the hive-down process is divided into 
6 stages, namely: 
(1) formation of the subsidiary 
(2) gathering the assets 
(3) the hive-down agreement and transfer of the assets 
(4) trading the subsidiary 
(5) sale of the subsidiary or the assets 
(6) accounting to the debenture holder 
Each process can now be reviewed in greater detail. 
3.5.1 Formation Of The Subsidiary 
Even if forward planning has not been possible, acquisition 
of a shelf company can be quickly completed. Use of an 
existing subsidiary will be desirable if group tax losses 
can be carried forward but may otherwise be impractical. 
such subsidiary will be likely to be tainted by the 
receivership and the associated suggestion of insolvency. 
Change of name may ameliorate the problem. An ultimate 
purchaser is likely to be concerned at the prospect of 
unregistered or unrecorded debt or liability62 (actual or 
contingent) or undisclosed offences on the part of the 
subsidiary compounded by the understandable reluctance of 
the receiver and debentureholder to provide any warranties. 
Use of a clean and untraded company previously unconnected 
with the insolvent parent will assuage some of these 
concerns. 
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The ordinary rules of company law apply to the relationship 
between the companies. The parent will usually wholly-own 
the subsidiary. The receiver may be governing or co-
director of the subsidiary or, if distancing is preferred, 
may appoint and control directors in the capacity of agent 
for the majority shareholder. This control together with 
ownership of more than half of the subsidiary's share 
capital creates the legal relationship of 'holding company• 
and •subsidiary' for the purposes of s158. The assets of 
each company are ordinarily treated (except for some tax 
purposes) as owned by them, beneficially and legally, as 
distinct legal entities. The subsidiary will trade and be 
accountable to its own creditors and members. The essence 
of the hive-down is of course this separation of legal 
entities. The receiver will accordingly be cautious to 
maintain clear separation of functions, particularly to 
avoid any implication that assets are held by the 
subsidiary as a trustee. 
3.5.2 Gathering Assets 
Difficulties in identifying and gathering assets will 
invariably arise, particularly in businesses based on 
turnover in supply of goods. Typically, the company will 
not be in actual possession of some of its assets and will 
be in possession and even have legal ownership of assets 
held as trustee or bailee for the beneficial owner, in 
particular goods supplied to it on hire purchase or 
retention of title 'Romalpa' terms. The Courts have also 
been regularly concerned with identification and 
establishment of trusts in respect of moneys or assets held 
by insolvent companies for investors. Some considerations 
are examined later. 
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Gathering assets may also prove difficult where beneficial 
ownership of assets held by any related company not in 
receivership is not readily verifiable. Control might be 
possible through voting rights. Apart from giving 
directions as to rights of ownership, Courts are reluctant 
to exercise their jurisdiction to extend the receivership 
to related companies except "in the most exceptional cases" 
and only when no other practical solution is available. In 
Rea v Chix Products (California) Ltd 63 the receivers of 
seven companies in a group applied for appointment over 
five related companies. Evidence of intermingling and 
interdependency of assets, undertaking, and business 
dealings was adduced. Williamson J reviewed and accepted 
jurisdiction in statute and in Equity to preserve property 
involved in proceedings. Orders appointing receivers were 
made on the basis that no power of sale of assets would be 
available until further evidence of the subject companies' 
assets and liabilities was given together with the 
receivers' proposals for sale. In a similar situation in 
Bullen v Tourcorp Developments Limited64 Williamson J 
granted the orders without conditions as to power of sale 
but on condition that the receivers made a full report to 
the court within 60 days. In steel v Matatoki International 
Limited65 Holland J granted the receivers application where 
ownership of goats between three related companies was 
unclear, The court was influenced by the urgency needed to 
facilitate sale to avoid substantial loss to creditors, the 
commonality of shareholding between the companies, the 
extent of inter-company indebtedness, and the absence of 
opposition from shareholders of the related companies. 
The cases demonstrate the use of courts to assist the 
receiver to assert proprietary rights: in that the 
receiver's appointment is over property rather than the 
corporate structure having possession of it the 
receivership device is appropriate to the problem. Costs of 
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rectifying the problem, to an extent created by the lender, 
must impact on recovery for it and other creditors. 
3.5.3 The Hive-down Agreement And Transfer. 
(1) Timing 
The threat of winding up will often precipitate 
receivership to protect the secured creditor against 
dissipation of charged assets. The fait accompli which 
preplanned and immediately completed hive-down presents to 
creditors, particularly those whose pre-receivership 
contracts are not likely to be 'adopted' by the receiver, 
may pre-empt injunctions, if only by reason of the cost 
factor. 
Can the receiver validly hive-down after the date of filing 
of a petition and/or after an Order is made?. If a petition 
results in a final winding-up order, section 224(2) deems 
the winding up to commence from the time of filing. Winding 
up terminates the company's beneficial ownership of its 
property, including its shareholding in any subsidiary and 
equity of redemption of security. Subject to any charge, 
such property becomes trust property to be collected and 
realised by the liquidator for the benefit of the company's 
general creditors (Ayerst{Inspector of Taxes) v c and K 
(Construction) Ltd)6 6 • Winding up is said variously to 
automatically terminate the receiver's agency of the 
company Gosling v Gaske11 67 and to "necessarily limit" the 
receiver's authority to act as agent Re Landmark 
Corporation68 , In either case, the receiver's power to 
carry on the business remains: the agency is not the 
essence of the receiver's power (Re Northern Garages 
Limited)69. The post-liquidation receiver becomes in effect 
a fiduciary for assets and proceeds and will become 
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personally liable as principal but retains indemnity from 
company assets (Bacal Contracting Ltd) 70 • such receiver 
will not automatically be agent of the debentureholder (Re 
wood)7 1 unless the debentureholder interferes in the 
conduct of the receivership (Standard Chartered Bank v 
Walker) 72 . In such case agency may be implied and the 
debentureholder accordingly may become liable for any 
breach by the receiver (American Express v Hurley)73. 
It follows that a receiver can carry out post-liquidation 
hive-down. Section 222 provides that "any disposition of 
the property of the company, including things in action 
••• made after the commencement of the winding up shall be 
void unless the Court otherwise orders at any time ••• ". 
The section applies only to dispositions within the 
company's powers and does not prevent the debentureholder 
from more direct exercise of powers of sale conferred on it 
by the contract, subject to statutory notice requirements 
and the section 226 requirement for court consent to 
"proceedings". As Goulding J said in sowman v David Samuel 
Trust Limited74; 
"Winding up ••• does not in the least affect [the 
receiver's] powers to hold and dispose of the company's 
property comprised in the debenture, including his 
powers to use the company name for that purpose, for 
such powers are given by the disposition of the 
company's property which it made (in equity) by the 
debenture itself. That disposition is binding on the 
company and those claiming through it, as well in 
liquidation as before liquidation •••• " 
In that winding up brings to an end the company's ability 
to trade, such application automatically crystallises the 
floating charge as a matter of law, and thus completes 
equitable assignment to the debentureholder. Further, the 
rights and powers given by contract are themselves property 
but not company property75 . Hive-down by the receiver 
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therefore is not a disposition of company property after 
commencement in terms of section 222: the receiver may 
proceed at any time, as principal if necessary, without 
incurring costs of applying to the Court for directions. 
The post-liquidation receiver is entitled as of right to 
leave of the Court to take possession of charged assets 
from the liquidator for the purpose of realising such 
assets for the benefit of secured and preferential 
creditors in priority. It is suggested that a properly 
conducted hive-down is unlikely to meet with objection from 
a liquidator in any event, first because the liquidator 
must defer to the debentureholder•s paramount right of 
recourse to charged assets; secondly because the receiver 
must ultimately account to the liquidator in respect of 
dealings with the company's assets and repayment of the 
secured debt; thirdly because preserving and realising 
goodwill may ultimately benefit the general pool of 
creditors; and fourthly the receiver may achieve a better 
price through ability to manage the assets (although fees 
may detract from this). 
A liquidator has a seldom-used power to hive-down as a 
method of beneficial realisation. Under the Receiverships 
Bi1176 the receiver is prohibited from acting as the 
company's agent post-liquidation unless authorised by the 
liquidator or the court, intended so that advantage of the 
receiver's ongoing powers of management can be taken. 
(2) Transfer 
The transfer will be conducted, pre-liquidation at least, 
by the receiver as the agent of the company rather than as 
agent of the debentureholder: 
(a) If the debentureholder conducts the sale, it becomes 
liable for the receiver's acts, defaults and 
remuneration 
(b) The debentureholder's common law duties of care over 
the property as mortgagee in possession resurface 
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(c) Proof of the receiver's agency for the company is 
readily evidenced by simple production of the debenture 
deed containing irrevocable power of attorney and 
documents of appointment. 
If hiving-down as the company's agent, the receiver can be 
in no better position than the company to override existing 
charges. Consent to the hive-down from the appointing 
debentureholder and all other secured creditors will be 
needed, either on the basis that the subsidiary will grant 
securities so that interests are retained in the same 
priority or by extending existing charges to secure the 
shares. Release of any subsequent security may be sought. 
Hive-down will be possible without such consents. Property 
transferred by way of enforcement of security will remain 
subject to prior charges but subsequent charges will lapse. 
The debentureholder in any capacity as mortgagee might 
appoint a receiver where, for example, part of its security 
comprises collateral mortgages over land or chattels. Where 
no debenture has been taken, a receivership clause in such 
mortgage might entitle the receiver to deal with the 
business conducted on that land77 • The right to sell the 
mortgagors business with the land might be implied in some 
circumstances78 • If the terms of any security were 
inadequate, directions would no doubt be sought before any 
hive-down was appropriate. 
Particularly problematic for receivers is the statutory 
requirement that notice be served on any mortgagor before 
its land is sold and on any guarantor before action is 
possible to recover any deficit arising from such sale. The 
problems have been canvassed in three recent cases79 which 
appear to establish the following propositions in respect 
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of corporate borrowers. By operation of s348(8} Companies 
Act 1955 the receiver need not give notice under s92(1) 
Property Law Act 1952 to the company before any moneys 
secured by the debenture are payable nor is the receiver 
required to serve a s92(1) notice before taking possession 
of the company's property, including its land. section 
348(8) does not apply however on sale of land such that the 
receiver must serve a s92(1) notice before exercising power 
of sale. Failing such service, the receiver might attempt 
to argue that the hive-down of land was conducted in the 
ordinary course of business as the company's agent. The 
fact that this sale might be exceptional or comprise nearly 
all the assets of the company will not preclude this 
argument provided the purpose is other than closing down 
the business80 • The argument will fail however on the 
mandatory wording of sections 92 and 348(8). The receiver 
will deliver notice to the company's registered office 
(which may well now be care of the receiver) and must wait 
the statutory period before conducting the hive-down. 
Rather than risk proceeding on a purported waiver by the 
company of its rights created by section 92, the receiver 
might consider hiving that land down at a later date. 
Strictly, an assignment of an unregistered lease by a 
receiver as part of hive-down of the business will also 
require service of a s92(1} notice on the company. In 
practice, this requirement appears to be conveniently 
overlooked. 
A mortgagee of land is precluded by s92(6) from recovery 
from a guarantor of any deficit arising after sale of land 
unless notice of intention to sell and to recover any 
deficit has been served on that guarantor at least one 
month before sale. Use of "mortgage of land" in s92(6} 
however suggests that a neither a debenture holder nor a 
receiver who exercise powers of sale under the debenture 
(as distinct from any mortgage) need comply. In summary, 
while the policy of the provisions is clear, their 
application appears unduly technical with traps for an 
unwary secured creditor. 
(3) Choice Of Assets 
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The decision as to which assets to hive-down is almost self 
evident: those selected tangible and intangible assets 
charged by the debenture which are of value, saleable, and 
necessary to continue and ultimately sell the trade as a 
going concern. These will invariably include goods, stock 
in trade, plant and equipment together with the 
undertaking, goodwill, and all necessary and assignable 
intangible rights, patents, and contractual licences. The 
receiver's ability to obtain assignment or novation of an 
essential licence may be crucial, whether statutory, (for 
example supplies of liquor or motor vehicles) or 
contractual(for example, rights under franchising, trading, 
or manufacturing agreements or under leases of essential 
premises). Existing contracts may be assigned to the 
subsidiary, particularly if completion of work in progress 
is intended, subject to the consent of other contracting 
parties and sureties. Employment contracts might be 
retained with employees subcontracted to the subsidiary. 
Book debts might be hived-down to provide working capital 
for the subsidiary, with capacity for factoring as a 
further incentive for any purchaser: if not transferred the 
subsidiary might collect debts on behalf of the parent for 
transfer to the receiver. 
Where there is doubt as to whether an asset is essential to 
the undertaking, the better policy may be not to transfer 
it: the asset can be hived-down later or sold direct to the 
purchaser before or after sale of the subsidiary. Tax 
consequences will be reviewed in choosing assets. Freehold 
and leasehold land might be excluded except where critical 
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to the ongoing concern. Prospects of assessable gain on 
ultimate sale, liability for stamp duty on transfers, and 
delay while Property Law Act notices expire will militate 
against immediate hive-down. Further, inclusion of such 
land will diminish saleability by increasing the necessary 
sale price. Any freehold premises can be leased to the 
subsidiary on commercial terms in the interim and hived-
down later if required. Unless leased premises are unique, 
the subsidiary may not benefit from taking on the 
obligations of lessee: the receiver will be reluctant to 
provide guarantees to the lessor on assignment. Finally an 
obvious point: even if all assets are transferred (except 
rights to call unpaid capital), the debenture as source of 
the receiver's powers is inviolate until the debt it 
secures is paid. 
(4) Consideration 
The consideration may be stated as: 
(i) Cash of a specified amount, perhaps payable on demand 
by the parent with demand deferred 
(ii) Issue of the subsidiary's shares to the parent 
(iii) A cash amount to be satisfied by such issue of shares 
(iv) Cash in an unspecified amount with an agreed 
mechanism to fix a fair value 
Three possibilities for use of shares as consideration are 
suggested: 
(a)The receiver (or the majority shareholder in the shelf 
company) agrees to transfer those shares to the parent 
in consideration of the parent transferring assets to 
the shelf company and paying the par value. 
(b)New shares in the subsidiary are issued and allotted to 
the parent which pays cash for existing shares. As such 
allotment is deemed to have been made in consideration 
of the transfer of the assets by operation of section 
60(3), the hive-down agreement must be filed at the 
companies Registry pursuant to section 60(2). 
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(c)The receiver and/or the debentureholder takes shares in 
the subsidiary and the purchase price is reduced. The 
improved debt-equity position will be comforting to 
future creditors, particularly where a floating charge 
is taken, but s60(2) disclosure will apply. 
In Great Britain a mechanism is commonly provided in the 
hive-down agreement for fixing the price in the event of 
default (say, on failure to meet demand by the parent) or 
on ultimate sale, typically such sum as a specified firm of 
accountants (perhaps that of the receiver) "acting as 
experts and not as arbitrators shall in due course upon 
request of either of the parties [to the agreement] certify 
to be a true and fair consideration1181 • Assets are brought 
to account at nominal levels with adjustment on 
certification. This method appears preferable to issue of 
shares as less likely to attract assessment by IRD on 
ultimate sale of the shares and in restricting the ability 
of trading competitors and likely purchasers to inspect the 
hive-down agreement. 
3.5.4 Trading The Subsidiary 
The subsidiary can now continue the essential trade. The 
receiver will have clarified terms of continuing employment 
and supply with employees and suppliers/customers 
respectively. Trading profits will be claimed by the 
receiver/directors for fees and expenses with surplus 
distributed by way of dividend or subvention payment to the 
receiver as agent of the parent or applied to the loan 
account to reduce the inter-company debt, or expended to 
improve the business to facilitate its sale. 
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As director the receiver may exercise the subsidiary's 
powers to borrow moneys on security but will resist multi-
banking. The intercompany debt, representing most of the 
value of the subsidiary's assets, will deter any third 
party financier in any event. In practice the receivership 
will be totally dependant on continuing indulgence from the 
debentureholder, particularly in the early stages with its 
cashflow. Trading losses will need to be monitored 
carefully. The debentureholder will depend heavily on the 
receiver's business skills at this stage but will no doubt 
have pre-set ceilings on that indulgence. 
3.5.5 Sale Of The Subsidiary/assets. 
A purchaser is sought through proper advertising, 
consideration of the method of sale, and testing of the 
market for the appropriate value, If a purchaser cannot be 
found or trading losses accumulate, the hiving-down 
agreement can be expressly revoked and the subsidiary 
liquidated. Even if this occurs within 12 months, any 
debenture securing the intergroup debt will not be voidable 
by any liquidator under s311 since at its execution the 
subsidiary was solvent and valuable consideration was 
given. On liquidation, the eventual proceeds of sale would 
be paid out under the statutory regime of section 308. 
A purchaser is located and terms agreed. If the purchaser 
rejects part of the undertaking or requires additional 
charged assets from the parent such assets can either be 
hived-down for sale or transferred independently. The 
purchaser will buy the issued shares in the subsidiary at a 
value representing par plus any increase in the value of 
the business after hive-down. The purchaser will also 
inject capital by way of advance to the subsidiary 
sufficient to payout intercompany loan account. 
Alternately, the purchaser may take title to assets only. 
The subsidiary is then liquidated at the cost of the 
receivership or abandoned. 
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A ready market may exist. Directors/management may offer to 
purchase assets either through a separate company (with tax 
advantage if related) or by purchasing the subsidiary or at 
least such proportions of its shares as will retain 
commonality for use of tax losses, the phenomena known to 
the displeasure of unsecured creditors as the "phoenix 
syndrome". 
Lightman and Moss comment82: 
"Frequently the existing management, despite any 
responsibility it may bear for the failure of the 
company, can raise more finance for the purchase of the 
business (occasionally even from the appointing bank) 
than can outsiders, and thus pay a high price, the only 
justification for such sale". 
Payment by instalments from trading profits might be 
offered by a purchaser wishing to strengthen cash flow at 
commencement. The receiver is at risk if the repayment 
regime comes unstuck and will battle at considerable cost 
even to return to the hive-down status quo. If it proceeds, 
an exchange of cheques on settlement will provide valuable 
consideration adequate to make use of the existing 
debenture with appropriate collateral guarantees/securities 
taken from the new proprietors. Existence of the debenture 
before serious negotiation is transacted with the purchaser 
will help avoid suggestions that the subsidiary is 
financing the purchase of its shares in breach of section 
62.The debenture can readily be assigned to a new financier 
and readvances made without section 311 problems. 
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3.5.6 Terminating The Receivership 
After settlement, the receiver will apply the net proceeds 
of sale towards satisfaction of the original debt (subject 
to priorities and preferential claims and after deduction 
of costs) and must then account for any surplus to the 
parent or liquidator. If the parent has no further assets 
worth realising, the receivership may then be terminated, 
the company left for unsecured creditors to pick over 
and/or liquidate, and the debentureholder might look to 
other remedies to recover any deficit. The receiver might 
retain funds for a time against, for example, liability 
under warranties for goods traded during the receivership 
or retention funds for subcontracted works. At the 
appropriate time the receiver will file final statutory 
notices of vacation of office under s346(3). 
3.6 TAX ASPECTS 
3.6.1 Goods And Services Tax Act 1986 
The receiver may be deemed a registered person in respect 
of the parent's continued trading (section 58). The two 
companies may form a group (section 55) so that the hive-
down supply will either be "disregarded" as a taxable 
supply within the group (section 55(7) (c)) or will be zero-
rated provided the assets are "capable of separate 
operation" as a going concern (section 11(1) (c)). The 
supply on ultimate sale will, in the case of share 
transfer, be exempt under section 14 as a "financial 
service" or zero-rated provided going concern status is 
retained. Section 58 is to be amended to ensure the 
Department has first priority for any net GST payable on 
proceeds of asset sales, trading, and related activities. 
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3.6.2 Grouping Losses83 
The hive-down is not a cessation of the parent's trade for 
tax purposes: the receiver may use all or part of the 
parent's current and (if section 188 applies) carried-
forward losses to offset any assessable income of the 
subsidiary. To qualify as a group for loss offset purposes 
under section 191, the lowest proportion of "common voting 
interests1184 held by a group of persons (or their nominees) 
in relation to the parent must be not less than 66% at all 
times from the beginning of the parent's income year of 
loss to the end of the income year in which offset is 
sought. The parent's 100% shareholding in the subsidiary 
creates such commonality. 
Since 1 April 1992 the group can offset by simple election 
at year end (without adjusting accounts) or by making cash 
subvention payment (recorded in accounts) or by a 
combination. Such payment will not be treated as a 
dividend. If the subsidiary is wholly-owned, payment by way 
of dividend will remain exempt until 1 April 1993 
(discussed below). 
Under section 188, the parent's losses from earlier income 
years can only be carried forward and offset if a group of 
persons maintained at least 49% continuity of shareholding 
from the beginning of the year of loss to the end of the 
year in which offset is sought. A new subsidiary 
established for hive-down will not have this continuity: 
losses incurred by the parent for the current past year 
after the subsidiary's incorporation or acquisition may be 
offset but prior losses cannot be used. While otherwise 
undesirable, use of an existing 'clean' subsidiary having 
such continuity will confer significant benefit in 
appropriate cases. 
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3.6.3 Consolidation 
It is proposed that from 1 April 1993 the parent and any 
wholly-owned subsidiary may elect to be treated as a 
consolidated group whereby income and expenditure arising 
from hive-down and all intergroup transactions are deferred 
until ultimate sale of assets. The parent's depreciation 
and amortisation deductions are passed to the subsidiary. 
on sale of assets or shares to a non-group member, the 
subsidiary is deemed to have acquired the assets when the 
parent did and at the same price. This applies to provision 
of services, payment of interest, distribution of 
dividends, and transfer of assets/stock. 
Each group member is jointly and severally liable for any 
assessable gain on the sale. Provided there is 49% 
continuity of holding, losses (including those incurred in 
the year prior to consolidation) can be carried forward. 
The 66% commonality test will still apply to restrict use 
of group losses by a newly created subsidiary. Overall, the 
regime will simplify hive-down but is unlikely, in itself, 
to cause the process to be more widely used. 
3.6.4 Depreciation Clawback 
Unless consolidation applies, where assets are hived-down 
at greater than book value the parent must write back the 
difference into assessable income. If there are 
insufficient losses available in the year of sale to 
offset, major asset sale will create more tax debt for the 
parent which, while not preferential, might be criticised 
by general creditors. If the subsidiary sells assets rather 
than shares, any later gain is taxable in the hands of the 
subsidiary as the hive-down purchase was for the purpose of 
resale. Available group losses and/or certification of 
price on hive-down, and/or consolidation will remove 
concerns. 
3.6.S Interest Clawback/Accruals 
Hive-down of land, including any interest under a lease, 
may trigger a 'clawback' under section 129. Any deferred 
interest payments may need to be structured to avoid the 
accruals rules. 
3.6.6 Sale Of The Subsidiary 
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If more than 34% of its shares are sold, the subsidiary 
will leave the group. Its pre-sale current profits can be 
offset against the parent's losses as above. As post-sale 
profits for the remaining current part-year may be offset 
by any purchaser against post-sale current part year losses 
of its own group, a premium sale price might be available. 
The parent's losses cannot be transferred for the 
purchaser's benefit: section 195A(7) disallows use of 
trusts or buy-back arrangements intended for such use, If 
the subsidiary proves difficult to sell, staged buy-out 
(say, by existing management initially to 33%) becomes an 
option. 
If the existing proprietors use a 'clean' related company 
in the group for a full buy-out, the commonality and 
continuity elements will be satisfied to retain group 
losses: section 106(1) (h) (ii) will allow such related 
company to claim interest deduction on money borrowed to 
complete such purchase. These advantages, allowing a higher 
offering price, will suit the receivership but are curious 
policy in an insolvency context. 
3.6.7 Liquidation 
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on liquidation the parent holds its assets (including 
losses) in trust for creditors Ayerst85: the subsidiary is 
unable to take further benefit. The debt/asset might later 
be converted into shareholding to avoid remission of the 
debt to assessable income in the subsidiary's hands. The 
receiver is retained as agent of the debtor, for tax 
purposes at least, under section 275 and is assessable for 
tax on income from the property. Proceeds of sale of the 
property are not deemed income: the receiver must now 
account for GST on such proceeds but will be able to return 
at a zero-rating. 
3.7 Scheme Of Arrangement-section 205 Companies Act 1955 
Hive-down can also be achieved by a scheme of arrangement. 
Although this method provides more protection for the 
receiver, it is slower, more costly and requires public 
disclosure. 
4.0 IMPACT OF DUTIES ON HIVE-DOWN 
4.1 Trading on 
Although not clear in case-law, there may be a limited 
positive duty to trade to preserve goodwill provided the 
company can fund trade itself, goodwill would otherwise be 
jeopardised, and sale with goodwill is likely in the short 
term86 • 
If the core business cannot be sustained profitably then 
hive-down is not advisable. If early sale is likely then 
short-term losses while preparing assets for sale may be 
acceptable. Monitoring and regular review are vital to 
avoid breach. 
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4.2 Sale 
A hive-down is a "sale" in that property is transferred to 
a separate legal entity in consideration of cash or value 
represented by shares. Hive-down of assets in exchange for 
shares is readily reconciled with the 'best price• duty in 
section 345B. The value of the assets is represented at any 
time by the fluctuating value of the shares plus the fixed 
nominal capital of the subsidiary. "Price" for this 
purpose is "the sum of money or its equivalent at which a 
thing is valued" Johnston Fear v CPH87 
Difficulties arise in applying section 345B to cash 
consideration. strictly, the receiver must exercise all 
reasonable care to obtain the best price reasonably 
obtainable at the time of sale. Without testing the market, 
setting a maximum cash amount which might be achieved for 
the assets will be difficult. Further, market valuations 
may not be an accurate guide to the best price available. 
In Lynall v IRc88 Lord Reid said: 
"the best way to determine the value in exchange of any 
property is to let the price be determined by economic 
forces - by throwing the sale open to competition when the 
highest price will be the highest that anyone offers". 
A price set too low might breach the duty. If the price is 
too high, the subsidiary must be injected with capital in 
consideration of the ultimate purchaser agreeing to pay off 
that set price as represented in the loan account debt. The 
apparent loss in value will promote discontent amongst 
general creditors. The certification process is also 
difficult to reconcile with section 345B: if there is delay 
between hive-down and sale and/or values do not remain 
static, then the ultimate sale price will not be the same 
as the "best price" available at hive-down and could not 
strictly be so certified at the later date. Further, sales 
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to a related party where the market is not properly tested 
have been held to breach the duty. In Tse Kwong Lam v Wong 
Chit Sen89 , for example, a mortgagee sale of property to a 
company of which the mortgagee was a member was not barred 
in principle but could not be supported unless the 
mortgagee proved good faith and proper procedures including 
advertising, choice of method of sale, obtaining 
specialised advice, and setting a suitable reserve. 
Hiving-down is however be distinguishable in that the 
mortgagor's equity of redemption is retained after 
transfer: on payment of the debt it will re-assume 
beneficial interest through its shareholding in the 
subsidiary. It is suggested accordingly that the duty 
should be applied to the total transaction, recognising 
hive-down as essentially a device to facilitate later 
•packaged' realisation. The obvious "mischief" addressed by 
section 345B is to ensure that any transfer of assets 
whereby the borrower loses its equity of redemption is not 
at an under-value: the certification process does not 
detract from that purpose. There seems no good policy 
reason to the contrary: the consolidation regime has 
similar effect for tax purposes. Before assets leave the 
receiver's control, any unrealised "values" are illusory. 
If later called on to set values, a court would look beyond 
any prices set by a receiver in any event. Interpretation 
of "sale" and "sells" in section 345B might accordingly 
exclude corporate assets retained in group control for 
later sale, with appropriate anti-avoidance measures such 
as continuity and commonality of shareholding. 
On final sale, full and appropriate advertising and 
consideration of the method of sale must be undertaken. 
Management buy-outs will necessitate particular care in 
that the purchasers have clear conflict of interest. 
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4.3 Other Duties 
The fundamental duty is good faith, including proper 
purpose and avoiding conflict of interest. In Downsview 
Nominees90 the receiver controlled the debenture holder. 
The dominant purpose of a proposed hive-down, which had 
been prepared but delayed for more than 6 months, was held 
to be to defeat creditors if necessary and to benefit the 
receiver personally. It is apparent from the tenor of Gault 
J's remarks that any hive-down would been set aside or 
negated had it been implemented. 
5.0 RIGHTS OF INTERESTED PARTIES 
This section examines the rights and interests of selected 
groups affected by hive-down. 
5.1 Beneficial owners And Trust Property 
Fundamentally, property which is not owned by the company 
beneficially cannot be secured by the charge nor defeated 
by the receiver nor creditors. Identification and 
establishment of trusts may however be problematic. In Re 
Registered Securities Limited91_for example, funds were 
pooled by RSL purportedly for investment on a contributory 
basis in mortgages over land. The court of Appeal was 
unable to clearly identify individual trusts 
notwithstanding the apparent intention of the scheme and 
its investors, and ordered pooling of all investments 
followed by proportional distribution to contributories. In 
Dakin v Goldcorp Exchange Limited92 (In Ree) Goldcorp had 
possession of bullion on a "non allocated" basis, being 
bullion either supplied or purchased by customers to be 
held by Goldcorp until request for delivery was made. On 
appointment of receivers, claims by customers exceeded the 
42 
stock of bullion. While an application to 
court to 
determine ownership was pending, the recei
vers gave notice 
of commencement of sale. An application fo
r injunction by 
persons claiming to represent one fourth o
f potential 
claimants was declined. On the balance of 
convenience the 
court preferred sale on the basis that the
 receivers would 
hold proceeds until ownership was determin
ed. 
Uncertainties while trust property is iden
tified may 
prevent or delay or require staged hive-dow
n. Clearly the 
receiver can apply to a Court for directio
ns. In Re 
National Pacific Securities Limited (In Re
e and In Liq)93 
the High Court accepted inherent jurisdict
ion in equity 
under the doctrine of Emergency to allow a
 receiver to 
interfere with the property of others and 
to remunerate 
work in respect of trust property carried o
ut during the 
emergency94 • Establishing the trust necess
arily will 
involve interference with the trust proper
ty by the 
receiver while a determination of ownershi
p is made. During 
that period the receiver acting in good fa
ith will 
ordinarily have lawful justification to re
tain the chattel 
and will not be liable in conversion
95 • 
Is the receiver entitled to hive-down asse
ts held by the 
company as ,legal owner while claims of tru
st are 
unresolved? such course would usually be u
nwise 
particularly if a second-stage hive-down c
an be completed 
once trust issues are resolved. Hive-down 
might be 
considered however if claims are not seen 
as genuine and/or 
an "emergency" is in prospect: a prudent r
eceiver would 
apply for directions. It is suggested in t
he absence of 
authority that the position of the benefic
iary is unaltered 
by hive-down provided that the subsidiary 
assumes the role 
of putative trustee, protects the asset, a
nd minimises 
dealing with it until beneficial ownership
 is resolved, 
effectively the position with trust moneys
 in Dakin v 
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Goldcorp. Whether the receiver 
can recover part of the 
costs of hive-down from such tr
ust property will depend on 
the circumstances. 
5.2 Unsecured creditors 
Unsecured creditors in particul
ar will view hiving-down 
with suspicion, in that viable 
assets are moved out of a 
liquidator's reach leaving a sk
eleton debtor company whose 
only valuable asset is a book d
ebt substantially committed 
to repayment of its own secured
 debt. on a practical level, 
the creditor may see the subsid
iary trading under a new 
lease of life, probably in the 
same premises with 
substantially the same personne
l under a similar name but 
with continuing trading profits
 and ultimate sale proceeds 
not available for general distr
ibution. The creditor may 
later learn that the new busine
ss is beneficially owned by 
the proprietors of the company 
in receivership which s/he 
is pursuing at some cost for br
each of contract. In 
reality, however the unsecured 
creditor is likely to be no 
worse off than if assets were s
old by the receiver under 
'fire sale' conditions. 
What remedies does the unsecure
d creditor have? 
(1) Liquidation 
Application for a winding up or
der will take time, is 
unlikely to prevent a hive-down
 nor speed up realisation of 
assets and distribution, nor, i
n itself, persuade the 
receiver to pay out as an inform
al preference. An Order 
might however be valuable in ap
pointing the liquidator to 
independently monitor a receive
r who is suspected of bad 
faith. The closeness of relation
ships between the main 
parties to the hive-down may al
so be a factor as in Re 
Hibiscus coast centre Ltd
96 • On appointment the liquidator
 
may apply to the court for orders
 limiting or terminating 
the receivership (section 346A) a
nd fixing the receivers 
remuneration (section 347), both 
expanded in the 
Receiverships Bill
97 • The hiving-down process may need
 to 
be unwound if a section 346A orde
r is to have any real 
impact98 • 
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If hiving-down of any assets with
in 3 years of commencement 
of winding up is at an under-valu
e, the liquidator may 
recover the amount of the under-v
alue from the subsidiary 
pursuant to section 311c(2). Alth
ough there is no exemption 
in the section for any bona fide 
subsequent purchaser of 
the related company, the Courts "
should be slow to condemn 
a bona fide commercial bargain ne
gotiated at arms length 
and with no intention of defeatin
g creditors" Re Burgess 
Homes Ltd99 • 
(2) Equitable Remedies 
One of the main advantages of hiv
e-down is the ability to 
shed bad debt. While a receiver c
annot disclaim pre-
receivership contracts, s/he cann
ot be obliged to cause the 
company to perform its obligation
s under them but may 
choose to enforce them. Specific 
performance is available 
against the receiver only to prot
ect a third party's 
"unique" pre-receivership propert
y interests, for example 
under an existing agreement for s
ale and purchase of 
landlOO. Injunctive relief might 
be available to a party to 
a trading agreement with the comp
any, particularly where 
the receiver intends to breach a 
negative covenant in the 
agreement and damages would not b
e an adequate remedy. In 
either case, the Court must enqui
re whether the remedy 
would have been available were th
e company not in 
receivership, and whether the rec
eivership has introduced 
any new element which might affec
t the exercise of its 
equitable jurisdiction. The receiv
er will not be ordered to 
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pay away any funds of the company
 so as to deprive the 
debentureholder of its priority n
or ordered to incur 
personal liability which it is re
asonable for the receiver 
to avoid101 . 
In Airlines Airspaces Limited v H
andley Page Limited102 the 
receiver of Handley Page proposed
 hiving-down the company's 
aircraft manufacturing business l
eaving the plaintiffs 
entitlement to ongoing commission
 on sales as an unsecured 
damages claim. The plaintiffs app
lication for an interim 
injunction to prevent hive-down f
ailed. Graham J held that 
provided "repudiation of the cont
ract will not adversely 
affect the realisation of the ass
ets or seriously affect 
the trading prospects" then the r
eceiver was entitled not 
to perform the contract notwithsta
nding potential liability 
for the company. The decision is 
brief and substantially 
ignores arguments of counsel. Whi
le Graham J's reasoning 
that the receiver is in a better 
position to disclaim 
onerous contracts than the compan
y has been criticised as 
"plainly wrong11 103, the case is 
a high-water mark for 
hive-down. It has also been expla
ined "as an attempt to 
enforce a contract that could not
 be specifically enforced" 
in equity against the company
104 and as a formulation more 
appropriate to court appointed re
ceiverslOS. 
The later decision in Schering Pt
y Limited v Forrest 
Pharmaceutical co Pty Limited
106 leaves some conflict 
unresolved. Schering had an exclu
sive distribution 
agreement to sell goods manufactu
red by Forrest. The 
receiver of Forrest determined th
at by-passing Schering and 
marketing Forrest•s product direc
t to end-users was the 
only realistic rescue option. Hel
sham J granted an 
injunction to Schering on the bas
is that damages was an 
inadequate remedy, notwithstanding
 acceptance thef the last 
real hope of saving the company w
as gone such that Schering 
and other unsecured creditors mig
ht be no better off in 
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consequence. Applying the above
 criteria, it can be said 
that the remedy was available a
gainst the company 
irrespective of receivership, a
nd the judgment did not 
oblige the receiver to trade or
 incur personal liability or 
expend the debentureholder's fu
nds. 
Receivers faced with similar co
ntracts may elect to hive-
down in any event on the basis 
that the other party might 
not be aware of its particular 
rights or might not be 
prepared to incur costs of purs
uing an uncertainty. The 
receiver will be mindful howeve
r that interim injunction 
might stop the process or mand
atory injunction might cause 
it to be undone. Traders might 
recognise as a result of 
Schering that they have leverag
e for discussions with the 
receiver. This is particularly 
so where (as in Schering) 
the "special creditor" may fund
amentally jeopardise the 
receivership. Payment to a cred
itor in Schering's position 
would not be a voidable prefere
nce under section 309(1): 
the receiver's intent is to pre
serve assets and protect the 
company not prefer the creditor
. Further, courts have 
recognised that "commercial rea
lity" may justify payment to 
a creditor "having a sufficient
 lever11 107. 
(3) Breach Of statutory Duty 
Inclusion in the Receiverships 
Bill of a duty to general 
creditors is a new development.
 Milmo Jin Latchford v 
Beirne108 rejected recovery for
 creditors as presenting 
"problems of very considerable,
 if not insoluble, 
complexity", Farrar109 consider
s that this is "the wrong 
conclusion for the wrong reason
s", separating secured and 
preferential creditors and guar
antors (who have remedies) 
from general creditors (who hav
e no direct remedy in equity 
against the company). Latchford
 was overruled in Standard 
Chartered Bank v Walker
110 where duty to an unsecured 
creditor (in that case a guaran
tor) was established: Lord 
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Denning MR applied the •neighbo
ur• principle and, "while 
[saying] nothing about creditor
s" also commented that "the 
duty of care is owed to [the m
ortgagor and guarantor] if 
not to the general body of cred
itors of the mortgagor". A 
low-level duty can be reconcile
d with a receiver's ''virtual 
impunity11 111 to repudiate contr
acts and thereby create 
unsecured debts: in pursuing th
e primary duty to the 
debentureholder the receiver ma
y not recklessly disregard 
other interests. The Bill does 
not affect ability to ignore 
contracts on hive-down: those l
iabilities are addressed 
elsewhere112. It is suggested t
hat recovery under this 
provision might be limited to f
unds paid or lost through 
negligence or fraudulently pref
erred or for special or 
proprietary interests, such as 
Schering. 
(4) Other Remedies 
To prevent particular assets fro
m being hived-down, an 
execution creditor might consid
er obtaining Garnishee 
Orders, Charging Orders, a Mare
va receivershipll3, or 
declarations of trust where app
ropriate. 
(5) Information 
A major grievance of creditors 
is the paucity of 
information provided to them. T
he Receiverships Bill
114 
considerably expands the receiv
er's statutory reporting 
requirements but stops short of
 the English system whereby 
an administrative receiver must
 send notice to unsecured 
creditors within 28 days and ca
ll a meeting within three 
months of appointment and must 
furnish reports and 
reasonably required information
. Notably however 
,consultation is not required b
efore any hive-down. 
5.3 Employees 
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Davies and Friedland
115 write of two deeply divided lands 
of labour law and company law with a
 volcanic island 
between where hiving-down occurs. so
me fine balancing is 
required between the two cultures: i
n New Zealand at least 
the balance may be too favourable to
 the debentureholder in 
that employees have limited preferen
ce for pre-receivership 
wages, salary and holiday pay
11 6 but are unsecured 
creditors for post-appointment entit
lements. Appointment of 
a receiver does not automatically te
rminate contracts 
unless an additional factor inconsi
stent with existing 
contracts is present, for example, s
ale of the business117, 
entry into new contracts with the re
ceiverll8, or where a 
managing director's wide powers are 
inconsistent with the 
receiver's managing agency119. 
Where hiving-down causes the parent 
to cease trade, it may 
operate to determine all contracts o
f employment120 • The 
subsidiary might re-employ with the 
employee's consent. The 
re-employment might be construed fro
m the circumstances: 
"in practice it is often idle to loo
k for individual offer 
and acceptance11 121. Passing liabilit
y to the subsidiary for 
redundancy compensation however migh
t deter purchasers and 
will result in a reduced sale price,
 in effect indirectly 
obtaining a super-priority for those
 employees over the 
debentureholder. To avoid this, the 
parent company might 
subcontract employees (subject to th
eir contracts or with 
consent) to the subsidiary, perhaps 
for a short period
122 • 
Arguably the parent does not cease t
rade but commences a 
new trade as subcontractor of labour
 without break in 
employment. The receiver will be cau
tious not to 'adopt' 
the contracts in the process. After 
the subsidiary is sold, 
some positions may be superfluous to
 allow dismissal 
through redundancy: such dismissal d
oes not breach the 
employment contract whereby the rece
iver risks criminal 
liability for aiding and abetting br
each by the company. 
Failure to give notice or pay in lie
u may however be a 
49 
breach: a commercial decision by 
the receiver to pay will 
again creates a super-priority. 
Redundancy compensation is 
not pre-receivership 
11wages11123 and has no preferential
 
status. The courts will not "seco
nd-guess" the receiver's 
decisions provided that s/he acts
 fairly124 and is genuine 
in claiming the position to be re
dundant, irrespective of 
the reasons for that situation. 
The law is case-driven and the ar
ea is a minefield for 
receivers: not only is there pot
ential criminal liability 
for which there is no right to in
demnity but also potential 
breach of duty if, in making an e
mployee redundant, the 
company's unsecured debts increas
e. If hive-down is 
beneficial in saving jobs then th
e receiver's personal risk 
must be balanced against socially
 acceptable standards of 
practice or, in economic terms, t
he contractarian view is 
balanced against the view that em
ployment runs with the 
undertaking rather than the struc
ture it resides in. The 
former appears current policy: re
alistic levels of 
redundancy compensation could st
ill be available by worker 
insurance or a Redundancy Fund or
 through social welfare. 
Regulations similar to Great Bri
tain125 might be productive 
whereby employment contracts rem
ain with the parent after 
hive-down, The purchaser may requ
ire dismissal of unwanted 
employees before settlement of th
e purchase, such that 
liability remains with the paren
t. on settlement remaining 
contracts are deemed to be autom
atically transferred. On a 
contractarian view, redundancy, s
uperannuation and pension 
entitlement should not be transfe
rred since a reduced sale 
price will result. The employee s
hould be entitled to 
terminate without notice if worki
ng conditions 
substantially change: change of e
mployer alone should be 
insufficient. Where transfer is t
o an insolvent shell 
company or where hive-down or sub
sequent transfer is later 
voided, contracts should revert t
o the parent with 
liability falling on directors or
 receiver where 
50 
appropriate. However balanced, hivin
g-down should not be 
made more risky for the receiver tha
n direct sale of assets 
nor (if that is the corollary) shoul
d the employee gain the 
high ground: even an uncertain prosp
ect of saving jobs is 
to be preferred to effective liquida
tion. 
Under the Receiverships Bill
126 the receiver will be deemed 
to have adopted and be personally li
able for employment 
contracts unless the employee is giv
en notice within 14 
days. The receiver will probably ter
minate all contracts, 
inform employees that the company is
 in breach, and 
negotiate new short-term "rollover" 
contracts which exclude 
the receiver's personal liability an
d allow for 
subcontracting and/or transfer. 
5.4 Subsequent Debentureholders 
A receiver for a subsequent debentu
reholder considering 
hive-down must either pay out the pr
ior debt,(ordinarily 
impractical) or obtain the consent o
f the prior 
chargeholder to transfer subject to 
the prior security. The 
prior chargeholder would be likely t
o appoint its own 
receiver unless persuaded that its s
ecurity was not 
prejudiced and ongoing interest inst
allments under the 
prior charge will be paid. The Harm
er Report proposed that 
a receiver be specifically able to o
btain an Order 
permitting sale of an asset which is
 subject to a charge 
having priority to the floating char
ge, The intention is to 
attach the prior charge to proceeds 
of sale. The 
Receiverships Bi11127 substantially 
follows the 
recommendation with provisos that th
e receiver has made 
reasonable efforts to obtain co-ope
ration and that the sale 
does not substantially prejudice the
 interests of prior 
mortgagees. The provision might be i
nvoked where there is 
urgency or unfair prejudice to the s
ubsequent creditor 
(such as likely loss of an intereste
d purchaser in a 
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declining market), if the prior mortga
gee cannot be found, 
has been wound up or otherwise has cea
sed to exist, or will 
not co-operate. In Downsview
128 : the receiver appointed by 
the first debentureholder declined off
ers by the second 
debentureholder to buy out the first d
ebenture debt without 
apparent regard to his primary duty to
 obtain satisfaction 
of that debt. The Court ordered the re
ceiver to accept the 
offer of redemption and to assign the 
first debenture. An 
order under this provision might requi
re full disclosure of 
the receiver's proposals, directions f
or sale, compensation 
for the prior mortgagee to be determin
ed on ultimate sale, 
and directions to release the prior se
curity on payment. 
5.5 Preferential creditors 
If hive-down of stock and work-in-prog
ress results in a 
profit on realisation compared to thei
r value on a break-up 
basis, is that profit caught under the
 fixed or floating 
charge? Preferential creditors bear no
 risks for losses 
through ongoing trade but are entitled
 to damages if such 
trade dissipates asset values; arguabl
y the risks of 
trading and funding of it by the deben
tureholder justify a 
super-priority. The receiver's functio
n however is to 
realise assets, and the price obtained
 is simply a 
consequence of a more beneficial sale 
method. The assets 
accordingly trace back to the floating
 charge: the receiver 
must account accordingly. Where the re
ceiver creates such 
profit through new (as distinct from a
dopted) post-
receivership contracts, the result app
ears no different 
provided future acquired assets fall w
ithin floating charge 
definitions. 
5.6 Landlords 
The landlord cannot require the receiv
er to adopt the lease 
but will usually be entitled to re-ent
er. Relief against 
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forfeiture is likely to be available to
 the receiver on 
payment of arrears of rental. Relief m
ight be available if 
the landlord does not agree to assign t
he lease to the 
hive-down company (refer Warnocks(l992)
 below). The 
Receiverships Bill1
29 will provide the receiver 7 days 
grace after appointment from which dat
es/he becomes 
personally liable for rent until ceasin
g occupation or 
receivership. This provision applies eq
ually to chattels 
hire purchase or lease debts. The equi
table assignment in 
favour of the debentureholder now precl
udes a landlord from 
distraint against plant which is subje
ct to a fixed 
charge130 • 
5.7 Receiverships Bill 
All of the foregoing will have standing
 to apply to the 
court for orders to enforce the receiv
er's duties131 and 
supervisory orders13
2 including setting remuneration and 
protecting property. 
6.0 CASE STUDY - WARNOCKS LIMITED 
6.1 Background 
warnocks Ltd, a national chain of 47 re
tail shops, was put 
into receivership on 16 April 1992 by A
NZ as first 
debentureholder after directors informe
d ANZ of trading 
difficulties and resigned. A hive-down 
of viable assets to 
a dormant wholly-owned subsidiary renam
ed Warnocks(1992) 
Ltd was approved in principle by ANZ an
d the second 
debentureholder, subject to taking of f
ull inventories. 
Three shops were closed immediately and
 seven subsequently, 
shedding operating costs of $1m per ann
um. Thirty-seven 
shops essential to the core business w
ere identified: 
rental payments and wages were continue
d without adoption 
of contract by the receivers on underst
andings that the 
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receivers would pay funds to the compan
y and would cause it 
to pay funds out. ANZ funded purchase o
f stock required for 
the continued operation of the core bu
siness; pre-
receivership suppliers were paid out or
 had goods returned 
to them. A winding-up order was made on
 20 July 1992. Hive-
down was publicised on 5 June 1992 and 
completed on 1 
August 1992 when core assets were trans
ferred to the 
subsidiary in consideration of a deben
ture granted to 
secure debt of $Sm. Warnocks(l992) then
 repaid $Sm to 
Warnocks Ltd and called up the unpaid c
apital. Warnocks Ltd 
then paid $Sm to Warnocks(1992) Ltd. ca
pitalising was 
expressly intended to provide an impre
ssion of substance 
and credibility to the market to encour
age ongoing 
suppliers and landlords. ANZ intend to 
assist trade by 
Warnocks(1992) Ltd for 18 months to 2 y
ears before sale and 
will no doubt monitor progress carefull
y. 
6.2 Litigation 
The landlords of Queensgate Mall locate
d a new tenant and 
purported to terminate the lease on 5 A
ugust 1992. Warnocks 
(1992) obtained relief against forfeitu
re on conditions. 
Heron J considered that relief in cases
 involving 
reconstruction would be the exception b
ut that the balance 
tipped slightly to the assignee notwith
standing that an 
alleged breach of section 62 (if establ
ished) would leave a 
shell company as lessee. Interestingly,
 His Honour 
commented that "essentially the same te
nant ••• remains for 
the balance of the term of years
11 133. 
6.3 commentary 
Hive-down appears a calculated gamble b
y a debentureholder 
who, having made full investigation, pr
efers the 
uncertainty of delayed sale at (say) 90
% of stock and 
goodwill valuation to immediate break-u
p sale in a flat 
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market at (say) 30%. Provided the unde
rtaking can trade 
profitably ANZ can choose the most ben
eficial time of sale. 
Orderly break-up sale of individual sho
ps and the capacity 
to franchise as the market may dictate 
are preserved. The 
undertaking is fundamentally reconstruc
ted with relatively 
low fall-out: the principled dealings w
ith suppliers have 
avoided chain reaction. Unpaid creditor
s and landlords are 
no worse off given the fact of liquidat
ion; warnocks Ltd 
retain beneficial interest in valuable 
assets suggesting a 
surplus may be available (subject to th
e amounts of 
preferential claims) for eventual distr
ibution. Continuing 
suppliers and 37 landlords are better o
ff. 
The receiver has completed a type of re
scue which the 
company itself could not have performed
 without cost, 
uncertainty and delay in setting up a s
cheme of 
arrangement. Full control of the proces
s by ANZ has been 
efficient and reasonable: Administratio
n might have 
achieved this result but effectively by
 using ANZ's money 
during any moratorium. Speculatively, t
he cost to ANZ of 
unprofitable trade over a short term m
ight not greatly 
increase the alternative write-off of d
ebt. Existence of a 
core viable business (with relatively u
ncomplicated 
undertaking and a one-off debt-equity p
roblem) together 
with the low prospect of short-term sal
e and ANZ's ability 
to finance cash flow appear key elemen
ts. Fresh management 
is now installed and Warnocks(1992) is 
operating freely 
without (it is assumed) risk to the dir
ectors of insolvent 
trading. The receiver has avoided perso
nal liability, 
ultimately to ANZ's benefit as indemni
fier. ANZ made the 
key decision but in standing aside from
 administration 
avoids ongoing liability, suppliers nav
e had an opportunity 
to negotiate terms of trade, Social and
 commercial fallout, 
particularly in smaller communities, is
 significantly 
avoided: not only has ANZ reserved itse
lf an opportunity to 
maximise eventual recovery in a more bu
oyant market (in 
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which goodwill may be significant
) but it is likely to have 
enhanced its own commercial stand
ing. 
Had the Receivership Bill applied
: 
(1) Notice to employees would have
 been required within 14 
days 
(2) Essential supplies could be re
quired 
(3) Rental liabilities commenced a
fter 7 days 
(4) A full report would have been
 filed by 16 June 1992 
including proposals to carry on a
n associated business 
and any breaches by directors 
7.0 REFORM 
The flexible nature of the techni
que precludes definition 
in statute. While the Receivershi
ps Bill implies powers of 
management, to legitimise the hiv
e-down process it should 
also specify an implied power to 
transfer the undertaking. 
The Warnocks transaction was well
 funded: some development 
of balances for employees in labo
ur law may be desirable. 
8.0 CONCLUSION 
"The lemon may, so to speak, be s
queezed dry11 134 
The device of hiving-down is no m
ore than one of several 
techniques available to a secured
 creditor entitled to 
exercise rights to convert a debt
or's property to cash. It 
provides a valuable option when t
here is a clearly 
identifiable viable core business
 which is capable of trade 
if unburdened of debt, and where 
it is further unlikely 
that the business will be sold in
 the immediate future. 
Separating and controlling use of
 the core of the 
undertaking is consistent with th
e fundamental ability of a 
secured creditor to stand outside
 insolvency. The device is 
not corporate rescue although its
 use may improve survival 
56 
prospects and incidentally conf
er benefit on other parties 
having interest in the undertak
ing. The decision to use it 
remains the entire prerogative 
of the debentureholder. It 
involves two further incidental
 processes, being likely 
liquidation of the parent and s
ome continuation of the 
trade pending sale. 
Two tensions in company law are
 also sensed: first, the 
truism that the company structu
re exists because of the 
undertaking and secondly, the c
oncept of separate legal 
entity which is at the essence 
of the technique. The 
separate entity argument on one
 side enables business debts 
to be unilaterally repudiated a
nd provides a defence to 
allegations that the hive-down 
property is available to the 
parent's creditors. The contrar
y argument that the group is 
one economic unit allows groupi
ng of the same entities for 
tax purposes, assignments of co
ntracts, and possible 
equitable relief from the stric
t s345B duty. The purer 
approach must be to maintain th
e separation concept, 
notwithstanding Lord Denning•s 
views, 135 unless equity 
demands otherwise. 
The duties hover in the backgro
und. The receiver is exposed 
to complaint from indeterminate
 members of each class, to a 
higher degree than the propriet
ors of the company, for 
decisions made urgently on limi
ted information and in 
stress conditions. 
The hive-down receiver is not a
 corporate doctor: more an 
undertaker doubling as a heart 
transplant surgeon in a war 
zone. 
"Hive" vt;to collect into a h
ive, to lay up in store 
(Chambers Twentieth Century D
ictionary) 
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